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ABSTRACT
The continuous growing amount of public sensible data has
increased the risk of breaking the privacy of people or in-
stitutions in those datasets. Many protection methods have
been developed to solve this problem by either distorting or
generalizing data but taking into account the dicult trade-
o between data utility (information loss) and protection
against disclosure (disclosure risk).
In this paper we present an optimization approach for data
protection based on an evolutionary algorithm which is guided
by a combination of information loss and disclosure risk
measures. In this way, state-of-the-art protection methods
are combined to obtain new data protections with a better
trade-o between these two measures. The paper presents
several experimental results that assess the performance of
our approach.
Keywords
Genetic algorithms, data privacy, categorical data, data min-
ing, information loss, disclosure risk
1. INTRODUCTION
Statistical agencies and other institutions are supposed to
protect the condentiality of the people or entities when
a dataset is published. However this task of protecting a
dataset is not as trivial as just removing any explicit indi-
vidual's identier such as Social Security Numbers, or entity
names (see [1] for details).
Dierent approaches have been developed to obtain better
protections [9], and they are divided usually into two groups.
The methods in one are called perturbative methods and are
the ones that perform a data distortion changing values by
others that may not be related with their meaning. The
main representative protection methods in this group are
Microaggregation [7], Rank Swapping [14], and Post Ran-
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domization Method (PRAM) [4]. The methods in the other
group are called non-perturbative methods and are the ones
that instead of changing the meaning of some values, they
try to generalize or suppress the values without loosing the
essential meaning. The main non-perturbative protection
methods are: Top Coding, Bottom Coding, and Global Re-
coding [6].
However, these protection methods cannot ensure the pri-
vacy maintaining the utility. For that reason the quality of
the protection must be assessed by dealing with two com-
peting goals: the micro-data le has to be safe enough to
guarantee the protection of individual respondents but at
the same time the loss of information should not be too
large. The discussion for this can be found in [3].
Datasets might contain dierent types of data. Two of the
most frequent ones are continuous data and categorical data.
The protection of continuous data can take advantage of
the number of possible values a variable can take, and the
arithmetic operations on them. In the categorical case, the
options are more limited. The number of categories is usu-
aly small, almost no operations exist on these variables, and
terms might have a rellevant semantics that needs to be
kept in the protection process. Then, the actions that can
be performed with categorical data are almost restricted to
an exchange of categories by others that already exist, and
a generalization of some categories into more general ones.
The limitation on the possible actions makes protection a
dicult task. In this work, we precisely focus on this cate-
gorical data protection case.
In this paper, we show how information loss and disclosure
risk can be integrated within an evolutionary algorithm to
seek new and enhanced protections for categorical data. We
propose an approach that permits us to combine state-of-
the-art protection methods with a post-masking evolution-
ary algorithm optimization.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes our evolutionary approach as well as they main
operators. Several experimental results are shown in Sec-
tion 3. Finally, Section 4 contains concluding remarks and
possible future work.
2. EVOLUTIONARYALGORITHMTOEN-
HANCE DATA PRIVACYEvolutionary algorithms are stochastic processes oriented to
nd exact or approximate solutions to optimization or search
problems. Those algorithms have a population of individu-
als, denoted as P(t) for generation t, where each individual
Xi 2 P(t) is associated to a potential solution of a given
problem. In order to guide the individuals from generation
to generation a tness evaluation function is used. And,
nally, some of the selected individuals are altered by oper-
ators with an evolutive connotation, such as mutation and
crossover, which generate new osprings with chances to be
inserted into the population as new individuals.
Then, the main idea behind this work is to use the state-
of-the-art protection methods for categorical data together
with this kind of algorithms in order to obtain good protec-
tions for a specic le just combining pairs of protected les
or altering their values in an evolutive way. The initial pop-
ulation of our algorithm is composed by several protected
les, so each individual is a specic protection of the same
le, and the main goal is to nd the protected le that best
satises our tness function.
Algorithm 1 shows our approach. Recall that this can be
seen as an instantiation of a generic evolutionary algorithm,
with some particularities described below.
Algorithm 1 Evolutionary Algorithm to Enhance Privacy.
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All the key points of Algorithm 1 are described in the fol-
lowing subsections. Subsection 2.1 describes the individual
representation, Subsection 2.2 describes the genetic opera-
tors, Subsection 2.3 describe the evaluation function, and 2.4
describes the method of selecting and replacing individuals
from the population.
2.1 Genotype Encoding
Usually, evolutionary algorithms are applied to continuous
numerical data where the values can be converted into a bi-
nary numbers and then it is possible to change their meaning
(values) by altering bits. This is done in this way to avoid
abrupt changes in the values.
However, in this paper we are dealing with categorical data
and this is a kind of data that only have meaning in the form
of a string and, in addition, its meaning can only be modied
by changing the entire string, so partial modications of the
string can generate categories out of our domain.
For that reason we decided to deal with the original cat-
egories directly without any type of encoding, this is, the
chromosomes of method's population are just the protected
data-les read and loaded into memory, where the genes are
the string values. In this way, the space complexity of our
approach will be determined by the number of registers n
in the data, the number of attributes a, and the number of
les loaded into memory f, obtaining a space complexity of
O(n  a  f).
2.2 Genetic Operators
Our proposed algorithm is based on two basic genetic op-
erators: mutation, and crossover [12]. Both crossover and
mutation rate are chosen heuristically, and we have decided
to use a rate of 0.5 for both. A random value (alter) between
0 and 1 decide which operation is going to be executed, using
the value 0.5 as a delimiter.
2.2.1 Mutation
In the case of continuous data people use mutation in order
to randomly alter bits of the genes to obtain a new ospring.
In our case with categorical data, we also want to obtain a
new ospring but we can not alter some parts of the val-
ues randomly. In addition, we have also to deal with the
constraint of that each variable have a limited number of
categories admitted as a valid values, and we need to take
it into account when altering them.
So, we decided to dene the mutation operation as follows.
Given a chromosome X (i.e. a protected datale), it is mu-
tated by randomly selecting a gene xi (i.e. a string value)
and changing it by a randomly selected value among all valid
values for the specic variable vi.
This operator is represented in Algorithm 1 as the mutate
function.
2.2.2 Crossover
Crossover is a genetic operator that consists on recombine
values from two chromosomes obtaining also two new o-
springs. In our case, crossover of two masked datasets X
and Y is performed by a 2-point crossing at the category
level as follows. Take a value position s at random as the
rst point, and consider that the two values at this position
are xs 2 X and ys 2 Y . Take another value position r at
random in the range [s;length(X) 1], and consider the two
values at this position are xr 2 X and yr 2 Y .
When s = r there is only one value selected, so only this
value will be swapped obtaining two new osprings Z1 =
fx1;:::;xs 1;ys;xs+1;:::;xng and Z2 = fy1;:::;ys 1;xs;
ys+1;:::;yng.
When s 6= r all values between the two points have to be
swapped obtaining two new osprings Z1 = fx1;:::;xs 1;
ys;ys+1;:::;yr;xr+1;:::;xng and Z2 = fy1;:::;ys 1;xs;
xs+1;:::;xr;yr+1;:::;yng.This operator is represented in Algorithm 1 as the cross
function.
2.3 Fitness Function
In order to evaluate the degree of protection of each indi-
vidual we use the two most widely used measures in data
privacy, the information loss and the disclosure risk, and
then they are aggregated into a single score value.
2.3.1 Information Loss
Information loss [8] measures the quantity of harm that is
inected to the data when it is protected. This measure is
small when the analytic structure of the masked dataset is
very similar to the structure of the original dataset, so, the
motivation for preserving the structure of the dataset is to
ensure that the masked dataset will be analytically valid and
interesting.
Information loss measures used in this work are: contingency
table-based information loss (CTBIL) [8], distance-based in-
formation loss (DBIL) [8], and entropy-based information
loss (EBIL) [15]. Then, the nal information loss result is
the average of all three measures.
2.3.2 Disclosure Risk
It is not enough to assess the protection quality with only the
measurement of information loss, disclosure risk [2] is also
needed. Disclosure risk measures are to evaluate in what
extend some information can be obtained about the indi-
viduals from the protected data set. Dierent approaches
exist about the meaning of disclosure risk. In this case, we
follow the approach based on identity disclosure. That is,
the intruder is able to link a record to a particular individ-
ual. Other approaches includes attribute disclosure where
disclosure risk also includes when the intruder can improve
his knowledge about a particular attribute of an individ-
ual without linking any record to this particular individual.
E.g., have a rough estimation of the income of Lois Lane in
Metropolis. This measure is small when the masked dataset
values are dierent respect the original ones.
In this case, the disclosure risk measures used in this work
are: interval disclosure (ID) [2], distance-based record link-
age (DBRL) [16], probabilistic record linkage (PRL) [16]
and, rank swapping record linkage (RSRL) [17]. Then, the
nal disclosure risk result is the average of all four measures.
2.3.3 Aggregated Score
At this point we have a measure for the information loss and
a measure for the disclosure risk, so we are dealing with a
multi-objective optimization problem. In order to address
this problem we need to provide to the evolutionary algo-
rithm a single score value which reects the quality of the
protection depending on the values of both measures. In
this work we used two dierent score aggregation functions
focusing on dierent aspects.
The rst score function is just the mean value of information
loss (IL) and disclosure risk (DR) measures, and it is shown
in Equation 1.
Score(X) =
IL(X) + DR(X)
2
(1)
Expression 1 has been used in several papers [2][18] . Ac-
cording to this expression, the best protection is achieved
with a minimum value for each measure (i.e., IL=0 and
DR=0). Nevertheless, given a particular score we prefer
to have the same value in both scores. That is, for a score of
20%, we prefer IL=20 and DR=20 than IL=0 and DR=40.
Expression 1 cannot represent this preference appropriately.
To better represent our choices, we present an alternative
function that does not permit such perfect trade-o between
information loss and disclosure risk. The expression is the
maximum of information loss and disclosure risk (see Equa-
tion 2).
Score(X) = max(IL(X);DR(X)) (2)
This second function penalizes a protected dataset that has
a large unbalance between disclosure risk and information
loss. Note that just one bad value of IL or DR leads to a
bad score.
2.4 Selection and Replacement Methods
Consider that the current population P(t) = fX1;:::;Xng
is sorted by the score function, with Score(Xi)  Score(Xj)
whenever i  j. Given a xed parameter N corresponding
to the population size, the selection method lters the best
Nb individuals in terms of its score value, and selects an
individual Xi in a dierent way when performing mutation
than when performing crossover.
Equation 3 is a probabilistic strategy which is proportional
to the tness function [10][12]. With proportional selection,
better individuals have a greater probability of being se-
lected.
p(Xi) =
Score(Xi)
PN
j=1 Score(Xj)
(3)
In the mutation case, an individual Xi is chosen from the
current entire population with probability p(Xi) given by
Equation 3.
From this selected individual it is obtained a potentially
new individual (as described in Section 2.2 above). During
the evaluation, an elitism replacement strategy is followed,
which means that the two individuals are compared and only
the individual with the best tness value survives. The use
of the elitism replacement strategy is to guarantee that the
next generation individual will be at least not worse than
the actual, then, it can prevent a loss of the best solution
found.
In the crossover case, two individuals Xi1 and Xi2 are cho-
sen. Xi1 is selected randomly from a leader group with theNb best scores. The second individual Xi2 is chosen from
the entire population using the probabilistic method shown
in Equation 3. A recombination of these two individuals
produce two new individuals, Xj1 and Xj2 (as described in
Section 2.2 above). In our case, each newcomer Xjk main-
tains a proximity relation with its parent Xik. During the
evaluation, an elitist niching method - known as Determin-
istic Crowding (DC) [11][13] - is followed such that only in-
dividuals with the best tness value in each pair (Xik;Xjk)
survive. Should be noticed that this method is eective in
maintaining the diversity of the population in terms of geno-
typic search space, but it does not necessarily guarantee the
diversity of maskings.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we illustrate and empirically evaluate our
proposed method. In the experiments we used four dier-
ent datasets extracted from [5]. The rst dataset is the
U.S. Housing Survey of 1993 and consists of 1000 records
with 11 categorical attributes containing information about
housing values of dierent people. The second is the German
Credit dataset and consists of 1000 records with 13 categori-
cal attributes containing information about the credit risk of
German people. The third dataset is the Solar Flare dataset
and consists of 1066 records with 13 categorical attributes
containing information about dierent detected solar ares.
Finally, the fourth is the Adult dataset and consists of 1000
records with 8 categorical attributes containing information
about the average income of dierent type of people.
For each dataset we constructed a population of protections
using the state-of-the-art protection techniques: Microag-
gregation, Bottom Coding, Top Coding, Global Recoding,
Rank Swapping and, Post Randomization Method (PRAM).
For the rst dataset we had a population of 110 protections
(72 of Microaggregation, 6 of Bottom Coding, 6 of Top Cod-
ing, 6 of Global Recoding, 11 of Rank Swapping and, 9 of
PRAM). For the second and third datasets we had a popu-
lation with a 104 protections for each one (72 of Microaggre-
gation, 4 of Bottom Coding, 4 of Top Coding, 4 of Global
Recoding, 11 of Rank Swapping and, 9 of PRAM). The last
dataset had a population of 86 protections (48 of Microag-
gregation, 6 of Bottom Coding, 6 of Top Coding, 6 of Global
Recoding, 11 of Rank Swapping and, 9 of PRAM).
Regarding the attributes selected to protect in each dataset
are as follows. For the Housing dataset we protected three
attributes: BUILT with 25 categories, DEGREE with 8
categories and, GRADE1 with 21 categories. In the case
of German dataset: EXISTACC with 5 categories, SAV-
INGS with 6 categories, and PRESEMPLOY with 6 cat-
egories. Flare dataset attributes are: CLASS with 8 cate-
gories, LARGSPOT with 7 categories, and SPOTDIST with
5 categories. Finally, Adult dataset protected attributes are:
EDUCATION with 16 categories, MARITAL-STATUS with
7 categories, and OCCUPATION with 14 categories.
To test the performance of our approach we performed three
dierent kind of experiments explained in the following sub-
sections. In Subsection 3.1 we present an experiment that
consists of using the mean of information loss and disclosure
risk as a score. Our second experiment is presented in Sub-
section 3.2 and, in this case, we use the max value of both
measures as a score. Finally, in Subsection 3.3 we present
an experiment to prove the robustness of our approach when
the best initial individuals are missing.
3.1 First experiment: using mean value as a
score
In this rst experiment we applied our evolutionary algo-
rithm using the tness function that uses the mean values
of both information loss and disclosure risk as a score shown
in Equation 1 to all four dataset populations independently.
Figure 1: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Adult dataset using tness Equation 1.
In order to evaluate the results of our experiment we splitted
our analysis into two parts. The rst part of our analysis is
focused on the initial and nal pairs of values (IL,DR) for
all datasets shown in Figure 1 for the Adult dataset, Figure
3 for the Housing dataset, Figure 5 for the German dataset
and, Figure 7 for the Flare dataset.
Figure 2: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolutionary
algorithm for the Adult dataset using tness Equa-
tion 1.
It can be noticed that, in all the cases, nal population ismore optimized than the initial population because of the re-
duction of the values in the tuples (IL,DR). However, there
also exist individuals in the nal population that have re-
duced their score value but obtaining an individual with very
unbalanced measures. Recall that, according to our prefer-
ences, given a certain score, we prefer balanced information
loss and disclosure risk. Furthermore, this eect does not
appear in the same degree to all datasets. It can be seen
that the Flare and German datasets have more unbalanced
nal individuals than the Housing and Adult datasets.
Figure 3: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Housing dataset using tness Equation 1.
The second part of our analysis focuses on the evolution
of the max, mean and min score values of the population
during all the generations shown in Figure 2 for the Adult
dataset, Figure 4 for the Housing dataset, Figure 6 for the
German dataset and, Figure 8 for the Flare dataset.
In these gures it can be seen that max score has few decre-
ments but most of them are quite abrupt, and this is because
our selection policy gives few opportunities to the individ-
uals with bad score to be selected, and when they are se-
lected they almost always have a considerable improvement
of their score value using parts of other better individuals.
The improvements obtained for the max score are the fol-
lowing: in the case of the Adult dataset we had a decrement
from 41:95 to 36:6 (12:75% of improvement), for the Housing
dataset we obtained a decrement from 36:96 to 36:14 (2:22%
of improvement), for the German dataset it was from 36:59
to 31:74 (13:25% of improvement) and, for the Flare dataset
this max score decreased from 42:53 to 33:56 (21:09% of
improvement).
Looking at the evolution of the mean score it can be seen
that it has more or less continuous decrement and this is
what we expected because in almost every iteration there is
a score improvement for an individual, so the mean score of
the entire population is also improved. Concretely, the im-
provement obtained for the mean score in all datasets during
this rst experiment is as follows: in the case of the Adult
dataset we had a decrement from 33:05 to 31:78 (3:84% of
improvement), for the Housing dataset the decrement was
from 29:79 to 25:25 (15:24% of improvement), for the Ger-
Figure 4: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolution-
ary algorithm for the Housing dataset using tness
Equation 1.
man dataset it was from 29:37 to 28:91 (1:57% of improve-
ment) and, for the Flare dataset it was from 29:57 to 28:13
(4:87% of improvement).
Figure 5: Dispersion plot of intial and nal popu-
lation information loss and disclosure risk for the
German dataset using tness Equation 1.
The last score to analyze is the min score evolution. In this
case it can be noticed that the improvement is very small
and the reason for this is that it is very dicult to improve a
protected dataset that already has a good score (in terms of
the tness function used) using other protected les with a
worse score. The improvements obtained for this min score
are as follows: for the Adult dataset we obtained a decre-
ment from 29:68 to 29:61 (0:24% of improvement), in the
case of the Housing dataset there is a decrement from 20:36
to 20:12 (1:18% of improvement), for the German dataset
we obtained a decrement from 26:68 to 26:54 (0:52% of im-
provement) and, for the Flare dataset did not obtain any
decrement.
To summarize the results found after the rst experiment,Figure 6: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolution-
ary algorithm for the German dataset using tness
Equation 1.
Figure 7: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Flare dataset using tness Equation 1.
we can say that the tness function shown in Equation 1
is not very appropriate for categorical data because it does
not permit to discriminate individuals with a high unbal-
ance and those with a low score in both measures. In ad-
dition, unfortunately, the alteration of values in categorical
datasets produces quite high modications in information
loss and disclosure risk values because of the limited num-
ber of available categories to use.
3.2 Second experiment: using max value as a
score
In this second experiment we wanted to try to improve the
results obtained in the rst experiment by applying the same
evolutionary algorithm but using the tness function shown
in Equation 2 which takes as a score the maximum value
between information loss and disclosure risk.
In this experiment we also splitted our analysis into two
Figure 8: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolutionary
algorithm for the Flare dataset using tness Equa-
tion 1.
Figure 9: Dispersion plot of intial and nal popu-
lation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Adult dataset using tness Equation 2.
parts. The rst part of our analysis is focused on the initial
and nal pairs of values (IL,DR) for all datasets shown in
Figure 9 for the Adult dataset, Figure 11 for the Housing
dataset, Figure 13 for the German dataset and, Figure 15
for the Flare dataset.
It can be seen that nal population is more concentrated
(in general) to pairs of (IL,DR) with more equal values than
the original population (compare with Figures 1, 3, 5, and
7 of the rst experiment). This was the expected behavior
because the tness function require to have low values in
both measures in order to declare a new individual better
than the parent.
The second part of this second experiment analysis focuses
on the evolution of the max, mean and min score values of
the population during all the generations. This is shown in
Figure 10 for the Adult dataset, Figure 12 for the Housing
dataset, Figure 14 for the German dataset and, Figure 16Figure 10: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolutionary
algorithm for the Adult dataset using tness Equa-
tion 2.
Figure 11: Dispersion plot of intial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Housing dataset using tness Equation 2.
for the Flare dataset.
It can be seen that max score decreases quite abruptly in
some points for all datasets and remain stable between those
points because our selection method gives more chances to
the best individuals. The improvements obtained for this
max score are as follows: for the Adult dataset we obtained
a decrement from 72:19 to 64:38 (10:82% of improvement),
in the case of the Housing dataset there is a decrement
from 72:65 to 69:63 (4:16% of improvement), for the Ger-
man dataset we obtained a decrement from 65:87 to 44:85
(31:91% of improvement) and, for the Flare dataset it went
from 76:17 to 50:22 (34:07% of improvement).
For the mean score evolution we have that it decreases at
almost every generation in all cases and its value evolves
towards the value of the min score because most of the
times the individuals are improved using the one with min-
imum score, so they go close to this min score value. In
Figure 12: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolution-
ary algorithm for the Housing dataset using tness
Equation 2.
Figure 13: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
German dataset using Equation 2.
this case, the improvements obtained are as follows: for
the Adult dataset we obtained a decrement from 47:05 to
38:57 (18:02% of improvement), in the case of the Housing
dataset there is a decrement from 42:32 to 30:12 (28:83% of
improvement), for the German dataset we obtained a decre-
ment from 40:76 to 33:42 (18:01% of improvement) and, for
the Flare dataset it went from 44:83 to 36:36 (18:89% of
improvement).
Finally, the min score has little decrement in all the datasets
because it is dicult to get a big improvement in this value
using individuals with worse score. The improvements ob-
tained for the min score are as follows: for the Adult dataset
we obtained a decrement from 30:70 to 30:28 (1:34% of im-
provement), in the case of the Housing dataset there is no
decrement for this score, for the German dataset we ob-
tained a decrement from 29:18 to 28:05 (3:87% of improve-
ment) and, for the Flare dataset it went from 31:77 to 31:63Figure 14: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolution-
ary algorithm for the German dataset using tness
Equation 2.
Figure 15: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Flare dataset using tness Equation 2.
(0:44% of improvement).
After the rst two experiments, we can see an interesting
fact. We have seen that, in this second experiment, in all
the cases the nal population is grouped around the pairs of
values (IL,DR) with more balanced values than the ones in
the rst experiment. However, this is achieved in a dierent
way in the four datasets. An analysis of the total number
of valid categories in the attributes show that the larger the
number of categories, the better the equilibrium of values
in both measures. Note that few categories supply a small
number of possible dierent registers. Then, altering some
categories increase one of the measures (information loss or
disclosure risk) quite abruptly and reduce the other one,
and this makes dicult to nd an equilibrium between both
values.
In addition, we have seen that, using maximum in the tness
Figure 16: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolutionary
algorithm for the Flare dataset using tness Equa-
tion 2.
function (Equation 2) performs better in the optimization
than using mean in the tness function (Equation 1) because
the nal information loss and disclosure risk measures are
more balanced.
It also should be noticed that in all our experiments we
obtained an average computation time of 120:34s for each
entire generation with mutation operation, and 242:48s for
each entire generation with crossover operation. However,
most of the time is consumed by the tness function (120:32s
in mutation generation and 242:46s in crossover generation)
and a very small amount of time is consumed by the rest of
each generation (0:02s in both cases).
3.3 Third experiment: testing the robustness
Finally, to conclude our study, we applied to the Flare dataset
our approach using Equation 2 (the maximum value of the
two measures is taken as the score value) but in this case not
including in the population the best 5% and 10% individu-
als in terms of the tness function score. This experiment
assesses the robustness of our method trying to achieve the
best solutions starting from worse solutions.
After several generations we could see that initial and nal
populations follow the same behavior than in the case with
the entire population. In addition, it can be seen that, com-
pared with Figure 15 , the initial population has a hole in
the region with more balanced pairs of (IL,DR) which where
the ones removed from the population (Figures 17 and 18).
However, looking at the evolution of max, mean and min
scores in Figures 19 and 20 we see that we almost reached
the best min score obtained without removing these solu-
tions. In the case of removing the 5% of the best initial
protections we reached a minimum score of 32:96 what rep-
resents a dierence of 1:33 points from the minimum value
obtained using the entire population, and in the case of re-
moving the 10% of the best initial protections we reached a
minimum score of 32:71 what represents a dierence of 1:08
points.Figure 17: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Flare dataset using tness Equation 2 without the
5% best initial individuals.
Figure 18: Dispersion plot of initial and nal pop-
ulation information loss and disclosure risk for the
Flare dataset using tness Equation 2 without the
10% best initial individuals.
It should be noticed that the fact of having better result in
the case of removing the 10% of the best individuals than in
the case of removing just the 5% is produced because of the
stochasticity of evolutionary algorithms.
So, looking at this behavior we can assess that our evolution-
ary approach is robust enough to achieve good protections
even when the best ones are missing.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed an evolutionary algorithm to
seek new and enhanced protections for categorical datasets.
We presented experimental results using four dierent real
datasets having a good optimization of most of the protec-
tions. We also realized that the diculty of optimizing cer-
tain dataset is related to the number of dierent categories
that are valid for the attributes to protect, that is, the more
dierent categories available, the better optimization.
Figure 19: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolutionary
algorithm for the Flare dataset tness Equation 2
without the best 5% initial individuals.
Figure 20: Evolution of the information loss and dis-
closure risk during the execution of the evolutionary
algorithm for the Flare dataset tness Equation 2
without the best 10% initial individuals.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that the use of the mean
value of information loss and disclosure risk measures as a
tness function score does not always work well in the case
of categorical data, and we proposed a tness function score
based on taking the maximum value of the two measures.
Finally, we also demonstrated that our approach is robust
against the absence of the best score protections in the pop-
ulation so, it is possible to reach the best score individuals
that are missing.
In addition, the advantage of using evolutionary algorithms
is that they can be easily adapted to other tness functions.
This is important for our approach because, as it is based
on an evolutionary algorithm, it can be adapted to possible
new measures of information loss and disclosure risk by just
providing a dierent tness evaluation function.
The major drawback of our approach is the cost in timefor the computation of the current disclosure risk (DR) and
information loss (IL) measures to evaluate the individuals.
This issue can be explored as a future work together with
some other ways to aggregate them in order to help the
algorithm to optimize faster.
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